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Abstract
Of late, incorporating smallholder land, through partnerships with agribusiness
firms that cultivate export crops has received some attention among scholars, policy-
makers and non-government organizations (NGOs). Some see such partnerships as
a means of raising smallholder incomes, and achieving rural development. However,
several case studies have shown that such partnerships can result in low incomes, and
effective dispossession of smallholders. This essay examines how this dynamic occurs by
comparing the experiences of smallholders in the Davao Region of the Philippines. I ar-
gue that despite the smallholders observable and enforceable property rights, the costs
and risks of cultivation, coupled with an unfavorable political environment generate
conditions under which smallholders cede control over their holdings in a partnership.
This results in both lower incomes, and exclusion from the use of their land1.
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1 Introduction
Of late, incorporating smallholder land through partnerships with agribusiness firms that
cultivate export crops has received some attention among scholars, policy-makers and non-
government organizations (NGOs). Some see such partnerships as a means of raising small-
holder incomes, and achieving rural development (see, e.g. Mondiale, 2008; Robertson and
Pinstrup-Andersen, 2010; Cramb and Curry, 2012). This is because agribusiness firms can
introduce new technologies, provide capital inputs, and link smallholders to markets for
their crops. Others have not shown the same enthusiasm. The literature reports cases of
smallholders losing the ability to use their holdings and receiving poverty level remuneration
(Hall, 2011; Colchester et al., 2011).
Many observers attribute the adverse outcomes of smallholder incorporation to gover-
nance institutions that are complicit to coercive activity (see, e.g. Borras Jr et al., 2010).
Few have discussed how even consensual transactions can deprive smallholders the ability
to determine how and who can use their lands. This paper examines factors that influence
smallholders’ decisions in choosing the structure of their partnerships with agribusiness firms.
I argue that the very economic problems which agribusiness partnerships are meant to alle-
viate may themselves force smallholders to accept contracts where they lose rights to their
land. I do this by first showing how one can disentangle property rights and control over an
asset and how the choice of a structure of incorporation (or business model) is an exchange
of abilities over an asset. This, in turn, allows one party to have control over land. I will
then illustrate this dynamic using a field investigation among agrarian reform beneficiaries
(ARB’s) in the Davao region of the Philippines.
This paper aims to make two contributions to the literature on agribusiness incorpo-
ration. First, I introduce a framework to understand how one can disentangle possession
and property rights. This can be used as a way of analyzing agribusiness contracts beyond
income improvements by understanding what provisions in a contract deprive smallholders
of effective control over their lands. Second, I conduct a comparative study of agribusiness
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projects with ARBs in the Philippines to arrive at political and economic conditions that
give rise to different contractual types. To my knowledge, studies of agribusiness partner-
ships among this population have often drawn conclusions from singular cases, or, have used
several cases to illustrate resulting political-economic transformations. This paper uses mul-
tiple case studies to illustrate how debts, risks of losing land, and lack of information on
alternative contract types inform a smallholder’s decisions in choosing a contract. These
factors are similar to those which influence smallholders’ choices in various international
contexts (see e.g. Cramb and Curry, 2012; Jiwan, 2013).
The essay is arranged as follows. Section 2 discusses current issues that arise from
smallholder incorporation, drawing from economic theory and the literature on agrarian po-
litical economy. Section 3 discusses the issue of property rights and contracting in economic
theory. I outline a framework for disentangling possession or control from property rights
using insights from legal theory and institutional economics. I then apply it to a typical
taxonomy of business models or structures of Incorporation. Section 4 introduces small-
holder incorporation in the specific context of post-land-reform policies in the Philippines,
and discusses the field work. Section 5 discusses the results of the field investigation. I
begin by giving a summary of the historical experiences of different ARB groups which I
interviewed focusing on economic and socio-political challenges they faced in making their
contract choices. I then discuss what these conditions mean for the resulting degree of con-
trol over their holdings specified in their contracts and present what these contracts meant
for their income and well-being. The final section discusses what these results mean for the
ARBs and highlights some policy thrusts.
2 Smallholder Incorporation
Economic literature provides two broad channels through which agribusiness incorporation
can yield benefits for smallholders. The first of these are macroeconomic channels directed
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toward rural development (Cook and Chaddad, 2000). Agribusiness incorporation can estab-
lish linkages between farm and non-farm sectors through the cultivation of non-traditional
crops. In a setting where subsistence crops are widely cultivated, links to other sectors may
be absent. Often, agribusiness firms cultivate crops for export rather than food or subsis-
tence. To ensure that these crops are marketable, it is necessary to coordinate transport,
refrigeration, processing mills and other upstream market links. These links can also come
through input markets such as fertilizers, machinery, and construction for building necessary
infrastructure on land. In this way, agribusiness investment can generate agglomeration ad-
vantages with complimentary industries, especially where agribusiness clusters form. Finally,
Agribusiness investment can also allow a country to benefit from inflows of foreign direct
investment (FDI) (Reardon and Barrett, 2000).
The second channel that agribusiness incorporation brings improvements for smallhold-
ers is in improving opportunities for smallholders to use their lands as a viable source of
income. Smallholders face challenges in both access to inputs, and access to markets for
their crops. Both of these can introduce difficulties for smallholders in cultivating their hold-
ings, and restricting their income generating opportunities. Monopolistic creditors who can
charge high interest rates often dominate rural credit markets. If such creditors are the only
source of credit to purchase inputs for cultivation, smallholders face higher costs of invest-
ing in their holdings (see e.g. Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990; Besley, 1994; Ghosh and Ray, 2016).
The lack of infrastructure such as roads (Shami, 2012), high transport costs, and necessary
technologies such as refrigeration (Barrett et al., 2012) create difficulties for smallholders
in accessing markets, where spoilage and crop damage present difficulties for smallholders.
Thus, smallholders may have to depend on monopsonistic buyers who have the means to
bring their crops to market. Agribusiness investment can relieve these constraints through
providing capital for inputs, and/ or buying smallholder produce. Agribusiness partnerships
which provide smallholders with capital relieve investment constraints for smallholders. Fur-
ther, partnerships guaranteeing access to transport, or buying crops can reduce the risks
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associated with marketing crops (Wang et al., 2014).
Considering the possibilities of agribusiness partnerships for rural development and poverty,
policy-makers and state actors in the global south have taken measures to attract and le-
gitimize agribusiness partnerships. Policy-makers have sought to provide a rationale for
agribusiness partnerships through development plans and guidelines (German et al., 2016).
Besides the development agenda, these also often invoke the ability of agribusiness investment
to provide public goods and community benefits through social entrepreneurship. In some
cases, governments have facilitated the process of agribusiness incorporation by identifying
appropriate sites for agribusiness investors and negotiating with smallholders (Colchester
et al., 2011). Identifying appropriate sites and smallholders that have the ability to cultivate
crops can alleviate some uncertainty by enhancing the quality of information that investors
have regarding the potential profitability of their partnerships. However, some scholars point
out that actions of states may result adverse outcomes of smallholder incorporation. Some
case studies suggest that states sometimes adjust environmental and labor standards in order
to make the prospect of locating in their country more lucrative (Jiwan, 2013).Agribusiness
investment may also appeal to local government actors that have influence over smallholder
communities through historic and kinship ties. These actors may use their influence over
communities to convince or coerce them into incorporation (Lavers, 2012). Trends in land
acquisitions further corroborate case studies of agribusiness firms taking advantage of weak
protections for smallholders (Borras Jr and Franco, 2013). Empirical studies by Deininger
(2011), Deininger (2013), and Arezki et al. (2015) yield evidence that agribusiness investors
are attracted to countries that have weak protections for local land rights.
While the actions of states may play a significant role in determining the outcomes
of agribusiness incorporation, these are not sufficient to explain the adverse outcomes of
incorporation. Social and economic circumstances may force smallholders into contracts
where they are completely dispossessed of their lands even without the actions of the state.
To understand how this occurs, one needs to consider two configurations of property rights.
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The first are property rights ex ante that form the foundations for contracting by providing
a secure basis for the exchange of assets. The second is the configuration of property rights
ex post- the resulting configuration of rights and privileges which determine each partners
control over land.
3 Property, Possession and Structures of Incorpora-
tion
In contracting, well-defined property rights are among the bases for partners to contract.
Secure property rights can minimize the risks of losing an asset that is used in production,
or, the risks of losing crops (Ghatak and Besley, 2010; Auerbach and Azariadis, 2015). This
same insecurity can also create frictions through the credit channel. Insecure property rights
can reduce the collateral value of an asset. The asset holder, therefore, is prevented from
being able to gain access to credit (Besley et al., 2012). When property rights are secure,
partners to a contract can ensure that their investments are safe, and thus, allow them to
make optimal investments in cultivation. Secure, well-defined property rights in contracting,
however, do not mean that an asset holder will have control once the contract is in force.
Contracts also reassign certain abilities to each partner which can determine who effectively
controls land.
In economic literature, partners to a contract choose a structure of incorporation or
business model, to overcome information asymmetries in the allocation of inputs such as
labor and capital (Das, 1999), asymmetric bargaining power (Schmitz, 2013) and other
uncertainties introduced by laws, culture and norms (see, e.g. Che and Facchini, 2009). The
firm structure is sometimes modelled as a structure of compensation where the investor
decides to offer either a share of profits, a purchasing price for the product, or a fixed
payment. Others model an ownership structure as the ability of one partner to take control of
the firm and its assets through the ability to exclude the other partner from its use(Grossman
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and Hart, 1986; Antra`s, 2014). In the context of agribusiness incorporation, some have
pointed out how structures of incorporation can displace decision making rights from farmer/
smallholder to processors or investors (Key and Runsten, 1999; Reardon et al., 2000). Among
possible rights exchanged in a contract are the ability to exclude others from the use of land,
and the ability to determine how the land is used. Such an allocation of abilities constitutes
a level of control that is different from the property rights that allowed contracting to take
place. For example, a smallholder may have been able to decide what crops are cultivated
on her holding before entering a partnership. However, a contract may stipulate that she
can only cultivate one type, thus, reassigning the ability to decide how the land is used.
These decision-making rights in turn may affect the income and benefits that smallholders
can obtain from a partnership (Cotula and Leonard, 2010).
One can disentangle control and property rights by recognizing that property rights are
a set of abilities that someone has over an object or an asset (Cole, 2002; Glackin, 2014).
A typical list would involve the following: the right to use the asset, appropriate the gains
from use of the asset, manage the use of the asset, and alienate it as collateral and sale.
The right to use land would involve planting crops, working on the land, and inhabiting it.
The right to appropriate gains from land may include determining the shares of profits from
crops. The right to manage land use may include changing what is cultivated and by who.
Finally, the right to alienate means being able to use land as collateral for loans or putting
it up for sale.
By definition, having property rights over land means being granted a subset or all of
these “sticks in a bundle” by law (Hodgson, 2015). Being granted some of these rights,
however, does not necessarily mean that one has full possession or control over an asset. For
example, a landlord may give a tenant use rights to land and even allow him to change the
crops planted. Through a sharecropping contract, the tenant may even have some right to
appropriate its gains. However, if the landlord maintains the right to alienate his land, he
may sell it to a developer and dispossess the tenant. Some sticks in the bundle, then, can
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be regarded as more decisive in determining possession. I propose the following criteria for
defining a decisive right:
A right secures possession whenever the absence of that right from the bundle of the
property holder can cause the property owner to lose all other rights.
In the sharecropping contract, for example, the right of the landlord to alienate overrode
the tenants rights to use, profit and manage land use. Consider now a communal tenure
system in which each member in the community holds rights to use a portion of a plot of
land. Within that portion, each family can plant whatever they need, and sell it if they wish,
conditional on them not impeding on the activities of other farmers. No one can sell their
plots, but they may also assign their use rights to anyone else in the community. However,
the village head, who himself can only farm a similarly small parcel of land, can decide to
exclude any person in the village from using land; at the same time, no one can exclude him.
In this case, the right to alienate is available to no one, but the village head has the ability
to determine who uses land. The village head, then, can override the rights of others. Thus,
the right to decide land users is decisive in securing possession.
Consider next a situation where a landowner’s bundle of rights consists solely in the right
to determine the user of the land, and to veto any sale of the land done by any party other
than himself. The user he names can decide on the use of the land, and how the gains from
cultivation are split. This case would be very similar to the village head. This landowner can
grant use rights, and take them away. He can effectively deprive anyone’s ability to exercise
any rights over land. If, for example, the user he chooses decides to appropriate 90% of the
proceeds, the landowner who finds this division unsatisfactory, he may veto the user.
As the example illustrates, the rights of an owner to alienate and decide the land user
are often decisive in possession. The right to use, appropriate gains, and change use can be
taken away whenever the two other rights are not in a person’s bundle. Different structures of
incorporation engender different levels of control for the smallholder and the investor. Table
1 gives a possible taxonomy of contracts in terms of Remuneration, and Control (De la Cruz,
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2012). Remuneration refers to the income or sources of income that each partner gets from
the transaction. Control refers to the ability that each partner gets from the contract. These
abilities are given as follows:
• Determine User - The ability to determine who can work on the land, or who is able
to till and harvest. This may extend to who can be employed under the partnership.
• Withdraw -Determine the duration of the partnership, or having the option to withdraw
land.
• Determine Use- Determine what is planted, or being able to determine whether crops
will be changed.
• Determine Methods-Determine how crops are cultivated including types of fertilizer
and materials used.
In Table 1, I present three broad contract types which are widely used in smallholder
incorporation (Majid Cooke et al., 2011; Cramb and Curry, 2012). We can think of lease
and growership contracts as two extremes. Under a lease contract, the smallholder forfeits
all control over her land, and most production decisions. In the growership contract, the
investor acts as a buyer of the smallholders crops. The smallholder makes most of the
decisions on how to cultivate, what methods to use, and who to employ. However, the
investor can use monitoring mechanisms such as checking the state of crops, restricting the
types of fertilizers used, and consulting with smallholders to ensure crop delivery. In between
these two extremes are what I broadly call intermediary contracts such as joint ventures,
and various management and building contracts. The decision rights that are traded in such
contracts differ considerably. Some joint ventures, for example, are framed as management
contracts where the investor advises and monitors cultivation. Others are arranged so that
the investor builds necessary infrastructure, and then transfers these to smallholders for a
share of the profits. In this case, the division of control is temporal. During the building
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period, the investor may have all the decision-making power. After that, he may act as a
consultant to a growership.
The distribution of rights in a partnership affects the benefits that smallholders get
from the partnership. For example, an agribusiness firm, can control what fertilizers are
used which may introduce additional expenses for smallholders. This can occur in both a
growership arrangement, or in a joint venture as part of a quality control mechanism. In
some cases, Smallholders may retain the ability to work on their lands, giving them another
source of income. Smallholder communities may also delineate certain parcels of land to
raise food crops, or build housing.
What factors contribute to how partners bargain for an allocation of rights and a firm
structure? The first of these would be economic factors- fertilizers, infrastructure, processing
facilities, and sources of investment capital. The second set are socio-political forces such
as the laws governing contract regulations, organizations of smallholders, and the degree to
which smallholders can get free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) regarding the differences
and advantages of investment contracts (German et al., 2013). The ability of smallholders
to obtain proper information regarding contracts, and even have the ability to refuse these
contracts depends on the actions of state actors, and even historical power-relations between
smallholders, governments, and investors. An investor who has developed connections with
state actors, for example, can influence how governing bodies weigh their interests against
the interests of smallholders (Nolte and Voget-Kleschin, 2014). The experience of agrarian
reform beneficiaries (ARBs) in the Philippines show how these various factors influence how
contracts are formed to generate incomes and the distribution of control rights over land.
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4 Land Reform and Agribusiness Incorporation in the
Philippines
The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the Philippines was passed in 1987
after a protest where 13 peasant farmers were killed in a mobilization for land reform now
known as the Mendiola Massacre. The stated objectives of land reform have not changed
since its beginnings: To achieve ”a more equitable distribution of land” founded on ”the
right of farmers and regular farmworkers, to own directly or collectively the lands they till,
or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof”(Republic
of The Philippines, 2009, Chapter 1, Section 2.).
Under CARP, once a person becomes an ARB and receives a Certificate of Landownership
Award (CLOA), he/she has to pay an annual amortization for the land within a given time
window. There is not a precise formula for payments, but the price takes into account its real
estate value (proximity to roads, water, etc), and the value of standing crops, as well as the
avowed valuation of the former landowner2. An ARB is entitled to use the holdings, change
its use, and appropriate the gains from its use. However, in keeping with the intent of the law,
the ARB cannot sell her awarded holding for a period of ten years after receiving the CLOA.
The implementation of CARP began in 1988, and expired in 2012 after several renewals.
Today there is a debate in the Philippine Congress of whether land reform should continue,
or whether CARP can be left as it is with over 80% of its intended area of redistribution
accomplished(IBON, 2013).
Soon after the implementation of CARP, it was observed that smallholders were enter-
ing leasing and growership contracts with agribusiness investors. Recognizing the benefits of
these, the Philippine government sought to encourage these arrangements, attempting to put
in place regulations that would ensure ARB welfare under such arrangements (Department
of Agrarian Reform, 2006). These arrangements were named Agribusiness Venture Agree-
2This can be found in the law, Republic of The Philippines (2009, Chapter 6, Section 17)
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ments (AVAs). The official definition of an AVA is an ”entrepreneurial collaboration between
ARBs and private investors to implement an agribusiness venture on lands distributed under
CARP”(Department of Agrarian Reform, 1996). Through these agreements, ARBs can ac-
cess upstream markets, gain access to capital, and use farming technology3. The Department
of Agrarian Reforms (DAR) can also monitor AVAs since local government units keep files
of CLOAs, and, at least in principle, the contracts that ARBs and agribusiness entities sign.
In a 2010 report released by the Philipines Inter Agency Committee (a collection of gov-
ernment agencies that also includes the National Economic Development Authority, NEDA)
AVAs cover around 1.2 million hectares(cited by IBON, 2013). The disparity between this
figure, and DARs official list of 50,103.1 hectares was acknowledged when I spoke to the
DAR authorities. When I had quoted the figure, one of them quipped: ”Parang dito lang
yata, ganyan na kadami”4. They said they were still catching up with listing all AVAs. If
the quoted figure of 1.2 million hectares is true, then, AVAs cover about 29.64% of all CARP
accomplishments as of 2009 and 12.41% of total agricultural land.5
The optimism of agrarian reform officials regarding AVAs, however, was not widely shared
by land reform advocates. In recent years, scholars have compiled cases of AVAs resulting in
adverse outcomes. Some examples of these are the work of Borras (2007), Menguita-Feranil
(2013), and Adam (2013) who show how ARBs in certain areas of the country are compelled
to accept contracts which leave them with neither control over land or income from its use.
These reports point to the dangers inherent in AVAs. CARP redistributes land but does not
address the existing social conditions that render owner cultivatorship difficult for ARBs.
Conditions such as poverty and lack of farm to market roads leave ARBs vulnerable to rural
creditors, fertilizer merchants, and produce buyers. Agribusiness investors are able to take
advantage of such situations to lock ARBs into highly unfavorable contracts that can last
3The full set of justifications can be found in the Administrative Order 09-06 from the Department of
Agrarian Reform
4”Maybe in this Province alone, there’s already that many”.
5CARP accomplishments at 2009 were at 4,049,016.71 has. and the countrys total agricultural land is at
9.671 million has.
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for decades.
This is not to say that AVAs do not have their share of success. The DAR has compiled
several cases where AVAs have resulted in ARBs being able to escape poverty, buy homes,
and even diversify into businesses outside of agriculture. The factors that contribute to
accepting favorable contracts are numerous. These include organizing among ARBs, and
being able to access credit and other sources of funding (Department of Agrarian Reform,
2006). How these factors influence the process of contracting, and which of these had greater
weight in the decision-making processes of ARBs will be clear in my field work.
Though the case of ARBs do not constitute all smallholders in the Philippines, in general,
they have several advantages as beneficiaries of the agrarian reform program. First, their
Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) are filed with the department of agrarian
reform. Second, the department of agrarian reform, in theory, is supposed to monitor their
well-being, and how they use the holdings they have been awarded. Finally, there are
municipal and provincial agrarian reform offices in which they can ask for assistance in their
contract disputes. In effect, I have deliberately chosen a population that is supposed to
have the advantage of some institutional backing which other smallholders do not. And
yet, despite these institutional advantages, ARBs have had divergent experiences regarding
their agribusiness deals. If so, the disadvantages they face may also reflect the difficulties of
agribusiness incorporation throughout the country.
4.1 The Field Work
Between March and June, 2015, I conducted field work in the Davao Region of the Philip-
pines, covering seven groups of ARBs located in three different locales, and two different
provinces6. I targeted ARBs who have entered into AVAs involved in the cultivation of
Cavendish Bananas. Cavendish bananas are one of the chief export crops of the Philippines
worth $884 million annually, or 14% of the countrys total agricultural export. The Philip-
6See Figure 1 for a map.
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pines is 3rd largest exporter of Cavendish Banana after India and China. The total land
area devoted to Cavendish banana cultivation in the country is 82,202.37 has. The Davao
region cultivates 46,681 of these (56.78%). In the DARs official tally, AVAs that are devoted
to the cultivation of Cavendish bananas account for 8,717.738 has. Thus, the listed AVAs
account for 18.7 % of land area devoted to Cavendish banana cultivation in the region, and
10.6% of land area devoted to Cavendish banana cultivation in the Philippines7.
By choosing one crop, I control for differences in prices, farming techniques, and necessary
technologies. Comparing Cavendish banana farms to another crop such as maize (for ethanol)
would be difficult since the fixed costs to cultivating Cavendish bananas are different. Before
a farmer cultivates Cavendish bananas, she must first dig a system of hills and canals. Each
hill needs several propping poles which can be made from metal or bamboo. These propping
poles ensure that the trees do not fall once they bear fruit. Planting is done so that each tree
yields fruit every 13 weeks. After 10 months, the first of the trees bear fruit, and farmers can
harvest these. If done properly, a hectare may have up to 1,000 trees. A farmer can harvest
the equivalent of 143 boxes of class A Cavendish bananas every week, fetching a bi-weekly
gross income of as high as 27,000 pesos8.
Growers, however, have several expenses. First, cavendish bananas are chemical and
fertilizer-intensive, and fertilizers can cost up to 990 pesos per 50 kg sack. Under typical
growing methods, a hectare of banana uses up to 3 sacks of fertilizer every 20 days. The
farmer must also treat the trees by injecting chemicals to guard against fungi and other
pests that may prevent the crop from meeting export standards. A typical grower pays for
chemicals delivered through aerial-spraying on a bi-weekly basis. The farmer must also buy
twine for propping up banana plants, and plastic bags to wrap new bunches and protect them
against insects. Finally, the farmer must also pay for labor. Typically, the total bi-weekly
7These figures were taken from estimates of the Philippines’ Bureau of Agricultural Statistics,
www.bas.gov.ph
8Class A Cavendish Bananas have a length of between 7.5-12 inches (19.05cm-30.48cm), with a girth of
around 2 inches (5.08cm). The calculation of the 27,000 pesos is based on the price that an independent
grower can obtain had she not entered an exclusive growership contract
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cost of cultivating bananas is 9,646 pesos per hectare9.
I asked each ARB group for a list of their members with addresses, went house to house,
and also travelled to places which were frequented by ARBs10. Three of the ARB groups
decided to host me in their offices to conduct interviews there. I interviewed 71 individual
ARBs and held focus groups with 4 of the seven groups I interviewed. Focus group sizes var-
ied. In the municipality of Santo Tomas, Davao Del Norte I interviewed members of 5 ARB
groups in total. All of them were workers for the Marsman-Drysdale Enterprises Plantation
Incorporated (MEPI), a company founded by a Dutch venture capitalist (Marsman), sold to
an American (Drysdale), and is now co-owned by Filipino backers. In 1998, the MEPI plan-
tation in Santo Tomas was distributed to its 1,109 workers. Two of these groups currently
have growership contracts with Sumitomo Fruit Company (SUMIFRU). These were the
Marsman Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative (MARBCO) and the Marsman Indi-
vidual Farmers Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative (MIFARBCO). The landholdings
of the remaining three groups are leased to MEPI. These groups are Davao Marsman Agrar-
ian Reform Beneficiaries Multi Purpose Cooperative (DAMARB-MPC), the Santo Tomas
Individual Farmers Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative (SIFARBCO), and the Santo
Tomas Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative (STARBENCO).
In Tagum City, I interviewed ARBs from the Hijo Employees Agrarian Reform Beneficia-
ries Cooperative (HEARBCO 2). The ARBs were employees of a banana plantation which
was owned by the Hijo group of companies. Before their current AVA, HEARBCO 2 had an
exclusive growership arrangement with Lapanday Foods. After Typhoon Pablo in 2012, the
cooperative could not sustain the growership contract. In 2014, they finalized an agreement
with the Tagum Resources Agri Industries Incorporated (TRAIN), a subsidiary of the Hijo
9I gathered these cost figures by going to the three agricultural supply stores for prices of twine, fertilizer,
chemicals, and plastic bags. I checked my figures with farm managers from three of the seven groups I
interviewed. I then interviewed independent aerial spray providers, and noted how much each group I
interviewed payed for tis item. Finally, I also checked my figures with pay receipts provided by one of the
growers I interviewed.
10By ARB groups, I mean a collection of Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries who have some organizational
identity or common experience. Six out of the seven I interviewed are actually legally recognized organiza-
tions.
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resources corporation owned by the Ayala family.
In the Pantukan district of Compostela Valley, I interviewed ARBs who were hacienda
workers under the Nuere family who owned more than 32 ha.s of coconut trees. These ARBs
received between .6 and 2.5 hectares each from the farm. They were not organized. In 2002,
a local company called Pantukan Agribusiness Development Corporation (PADCOR) leased
the lands from the ARBs. The venture failed, and in 2009, the investor sold the lease to
Musahammat farms, a Middle Eastern company.
The AVAs I chose are on the two ends of the spectrum of contracts: lease, and growership
arrangements. I chose to focus on these because of their prevalence among the officially listed
AVAs which cultivate cavendish bananas. Of these 61 AVAs, 29 out of 61 (45.9%) are under
a lease contract, while 28 out of 61 (48%) are a under growership arrangement. In all, 57
out of 61 or 93.4% are under these two contracts11.
Table 2 gives a summary of the individual interviewees in my sample from each group.
The ARBs in the sample are a largely old, male population, with the average age for each
group being more than 56 years old except for HEARBCO 2 in Tagum city. The average
household size for each group is over four members. Most of those interviewed in each group
own their house with an average experience of more than 26 years in cultivating Cavendish
bananas. The exception to this is the ARBs in the Pantukan district of Compostela Valley,
only one of whom owns their dwelling and lot, while none have experience with cultivating
Cavendish bananas.
From the table, one can see no immediate relationship between the level of education
that most members of each group obtained, and the types of contracts that they enter.
Intuitively, one may think that having a higher level of education will allow ARB members
to deliberate in a more informed manner about the types of contracts available, and the
consequences these may have for their well-being. While there is no doubt a possible bias
in my small sample, a clear relationship between contractual type and education is absent.
11The figures here are based on a list of AVAs which I obtained from the DAR.
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Many of the eight interviewees from MARBCO have not finished High School, and many of
those from MIFARBCO have only graduated High School. By contrast, most of the ARBs
from, HEARBCO 2 have finished college. One may attribute this result to the fact that the
sample is not completely random within groups. The respondents may have self-selected to
interview. However, as I shall show, group level characteristics played a significant role in
the types of contracts that the ARBs obtained.
5 Findings
Table 3 gives a historical summary of the AVAs. Three of the seven ARB groups have had
only one AVA partner. These are the Lessor groups in Santo Tomas, Davao Del Norte:
DAMARB-MPC, SIFARBCO, and STARBENCO. These ARBs have had their lands leased
to the Marsman-Drysdale Estate Plantations Incorporated (MEPI) since they have been
ARBs. By contrast, the other ARB groups have had two AVA partners. The grower co-
operatives transitioned from selling to MEPI to selling to Sumitomo Fruit (SUMIFRU).
HEARBCO 2 transitioned from a growership contract with Lapanday fruits to a lease agree-
ment with TRAIN. Finally, the ARBs from pantukan, Compostela Valley used to have a
lease arrangement with PADCOR, and now lease their holdings to Musahamat farms. It
is worth noting that, currently, three out of the five lessor ARB groups currently have a
contractual dispute with their AVA partners. These disputes are in various stages of the
legal process, but all are efforts by the ARBs to withdraw or renegotiate lease agreements.
Finally, of the seven ARB groups, four are currently leased to the pre-agrarian reform land
owners.
Factors of Contracting -To obtain information about the historical and political factors
that contributed to the formation of the AVAs among the different groups, I conducted
focus group discussions with four out of five lessor groups, and key informant interviews
with the chairs and board members of each grower cooperative, and one other lessor group.
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A summary of these historical and political conditions is given by Table 4.
The first column states whether or not the ARBs were organized into some union, co-
operative, or association at the time of bargaining. Presumably, groups that bargain have
more power vis-a-vis an investor since groups can pool resources to hire lawyers, appeal
to authorities in city centers, and mobilize for interventions in municipal agrarian reform
offices. However, this may also result in unfavorable outcomes if influential persons in the
groups side with the investor. The next three columns state whether the groups had access
to advocacy from non-government organizations, or from the DAR itself, and whether the
groups had genuinely democratic processes. Advocacy includes education on AVAs and legal
assistance. Being able to access pro-land reform civic organizations can help the ARBs en-
sure that the resulting contracts are in line with the stated objectives of CARP: improving
the lives of the ARBs, and ensuring they maintain control over their holdings. Membership
consultation is important to ensure that a handful of influential persons did not drive the
contracting process. The last column states whether members of the group were allowed to
make a decision on their current AVA at all. The absence of this ability would imply that
the current AVAs were arrived at without Free, Prior, and Informed Consent of individual
ARBs.
The final column is organizational debt. Though debt could be designated as an economic
circumstance, it may be the case that the ARB groups faced tensions between the interests
of the organization, or, the interests of individual members. A cooperative of growers, for
example, might have members that have earned, saved, and prospered, while others may
not. Often, cooperatives take out loans to ensure that their members have access to inputs,
and to maintain the infrastructure for cultivating bananas. If the cooperative goes bankrupt,
members who have done well may not need the cooperatives help, but those who did not
may want to enter lease arrangements for a steady income. I shall now discuss the historical
specificity of each group.
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Santo Tomas -Santo Tomas calls itself a banana town. Among the large fruit exporters
that have plantations in Santo Tomas are Lapanday Foods, DOLE, and MEPI. When CARP
began its implementation in 1988, the Marsman Estates more than 1,400 hectares in Santo
Tomas, Davao Del Norte were given a ten-year grace period. The plantation had been in
place since 1969, when the Marsman group of companies decided to set their sights on banana
cultivation. In 1998, the plantation was set for redistribution. According to focus groups and
key-informant interviews, MEPI pushed for lease contracts using forms of bribery, coercion,
and deception. How the ARBs responded to Marsmans tactics, and the resources available
to them affected the types of contracts currently governing their holdings.
Santo Tomas- The Growers -MARBCO and MIFARBCO were once one organization
called the Marsman Estate Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association Incorporated (MEAR-
BAI). They had split before each began to contract with SUMIFRU over the management
of the cooperatives over 136 hectares of land. Key informant interviews point to three rea-
sons why the split occurred. The first is that MIFARBCOs members wanted to individually
manage their plots, while the cooperative can manage a packing plant, sales, quality checks,
legal assistance and obtaining inputs. They claim that this model was better since the area
that each ARB would monitor would be limited to a hectare, and they can make individual
improvements on their holdings. The second is that, initially, MEARBAI chose a business
model where its members shared profits equally. MIFARBCOs members cited that this re-
sulted in a classic free-rider problem: some ARBs did not handle their tasks properly, while
those who worked hard felt that they did not get the appropriate remuneration for their
labor. Finally, some members of MIFARBCO cited corruption in MEARBAIs leadership.
However, I have not been able to obtain any evidence for this accusation.
Regardless, MIFARBCOs split from MEARBAI, and MEARBAIs metamorphosis into
MARBCO did not seem to make a difference in the types of contracts they agreed upon with
SUMIFRU. They receive the same income per box of class A bananas, and they have almost
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identical provisions on their obligations and rights. The only difference is that MARBCO
is able to sell its class B bananas to independent buyers, while MIFARBCO sells solely to
SUMIFRU12.
In 1998, MEARBAI members already had contacts with pro-agrarian reform NGOs.
These provided them legal assistance and education on different types of AVAs. The ed-
ucation they received included seminars on management, marketing, and best practices in
cultivation. They also partook in a lakbay-aral or educational field visits where they learned
about the experiences of growers and other types of agribusiness arrangements. Through
updating and sending a variety of members to other farms, MEARBAI was able to convince
its members to insist on a growership.
Both groups approached SUMIFRU independently. At this time, they already had three
years of experience as growers and legal contacts from asserting their claims as ARBs. They
felt that MEPI was deliberately paying them low prices for their bananas, but they had to
find an alternative buyer who would offer better prices, and who was willing to pay MEPI
for the total of 293,733 pesos per hectare. SUMIFRU was such a buyer, and in 2007, they
began a growership agreement after deliberating with their members. The consensus was
that if they could get better prices, they should switch partners. Today, officials of both
coops say that their debts are almost paid off, and they are ready to become sellers to the
highest bidder by 2017 when their contracts with SUMIFRU end.
Santo Tomas-The Lessors -The members of the three lessor groups from Santo Tomas
Davao Del Norte all belonged to an organization called the Davao Marsman Agrarian Re-
form Beneficiary Association Incorporated (DAMARBAI). When the Marsman estate was
redistributed in 1998, DAMARBAI was seen as an association controlled by MEPI manage-
ment, as opposed to MEARBAI, which was organized by outside NGOs. There were different
accounts about DAMARBAIs actions in 1998. My focus group discussion with current mem-
12Class B bananas fall short of the measurements of class A bananas, but were whole, had no bruises or
scales (cork-like aberrations on the skin), and were generally deemed to be fit for consumption. These are
often sold in local supermarkets. One of MARBCO’s buyers is 7-11.
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bers of DAMARB-MPC suggest that the lease contract was a product of assessing the risks
and costs of a growership, and their estimation of the strength of the existing union of MEPI
farm workers. The rationale was that cultivating bananas was far too costly. The costs of
fertilizers, maintaining the infrastructure, paying for labor, and building and maintaining a
packing house were too costly. They did not have any capital, and they would already have
to pay for the amortization of the land. On top of this, MEPI would have been their buyer.
If they crossed MEPI by taking full ownership of their awarded holdings, then, MEPI would
take measures to ensure that they were not successful. On the other hand, under a leasing
arrangement, they would not have to pay for amortization and inputs, and MEPI would have
to honor the collective bargaining agreements they had from the farm workers union named
the Davao Marsman labor Union (DAMLU). This cost-benefit calculation is encapsulated in
their name for the contract: ”Walang personalan. Trabaho lang”13
In contrast to their fellow farmworkers in MEARBAI, I was told by focus groups with
SIFARBCO and key informant interviews with STARBENCO that the members of DAMAR-
BAI had not gone to see other farms under different agribusiness arrangements. Instead,
much of the education they received towed the line that growership was risky, and that they
would be saddled with high-levels of debt. Further, the lawyers that they consulted were
MEPI contacts. Eventually, the ARBs got their certificates in 2002, and a debt-free leasing
arrangement where they were secure in their livelihoods. Unfortunately, it would not last.
In 2004 some of DAMARBAIs members decided to break ranks. MEPI had kept their
lease payments at the lowest level for about two years, citing bad harvests. 14. Some 100
ARBs decided that they wanted to opt for a growership option. They occupied their lots
and picketed the municipal agrarian reform office. This was the birth of the Santo Tomas
Agrarian Reform Beneficiary Association Incorporated (STARBAI). STARBAIs members
were temporarily retrenched and reinstated in 2008. In 2010, another land occupation broke
13”Nothing personal. Its just work”. This is equivalent to the American: “Nothing personal. Its just
business.” The phrase is a variation on a line uttered in an action movie.
14See Table 9. The lease payments to members of DAMARBAI follows a step function, that rises with the
number of boxes
22
out and MEPI decided to retrench all 241 workers belonging to STARBAI. MEPI was able
to do this since the lease arrangement gives them the right to hire and fire workers. Thus,
while the ARBs legally own the land, the lease arrangement makes them employees of MEPI.
Further, MEPI can hire and fire at will, which de facto excluded the offspring of STARBAIs
members from working on their parents holdings. The municipality of Santo Tomas deployed
the police against the members of STARBAI. At least one person was killed during the
dispersal.
It is not clear from focus group discussions why STARBAI split into SIFARBCO and
STARBENCO. Accusations of capitulating to MEPI and closeness to DAMARB-MPC go
both ways 15. What is clear however is that both groups would like to withdraw their holdings
from the leasing arrangement, and cultivate these as growers. They have already taken their
case to the authorities with the help of several land reform advocates. As of this writing,
SIFARBCO and STARBENCO are waiting on the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council
(PARC) to adjudicate their case. Reports from their lawyers indicate that the PARC has
adjudicated in their favor. The only signature they need as of the time of this writing is that
of the sitting president’s, Benigno S. Aquino III.
Tagum City-HEARBCO 2 -HEARBCO 2 contracted with TRAIN in 2014, after a
typhoon hit their plantations, destroying much of their crops. While typhoon Pablo was
certainly a necessary cause for HEARBCO 2s switch from a grower to lessor, it is certainly
not sufficient. Prior to the typhoon hitting Mindanao, Lapanday Foods and HEARBCO 2
already had a contentious partnership.
HEARBCO 2 did not contract directly with Lapanday. Lapanday became HEARBCO 2s
buyer when Hijo sold their growership agreement. According to a focus group discussion with
members of HEARBCO 2, Lapanday made several demands that forced HEARBCO 2 to go
into debt. One example of this was building infrastructure such as irrigation pipes on the
15After the events of 2004, DAMARBAI had changed its name to Davao Marsman Agrarian Reform
Beneficiaries Development Cooperative (DAMARB-MPC), and eventually changed to their current name.
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farm which the members of HEARBCO 2 had not agreed upon, but Lapanday insisted was
necessary. Lapanday then counted this as part of the ARBs debt and deducted these from the
payments to the ARBs. Another example is imposing the use of certain fertilizers that only
Lapanday sold as a form of quality control. These actions by Lapanday brought HEARBCO
2, along with other cooperatives that sprung from Hijo employees, to the attention of land
reform advocates. Thus, by the time they had broken with Lapanday, HEARBCO 2 had
legal assistance and contacts with numerous NGOs.
When typhoon Pablo hit, HEARBCO 2 was already 52 million pesos in debt. The
typhoon destroyed many of the trees in HEARBCO 2s farm. In a focus group discussion, I
asked for an estimate of how many trees were destroyed. They laughed and responded Naku,
dili na namin gi-isip, kay nagtu-aw kami diha! 16. This destruction was sure to increase their
debts with Lapanday.
Instead of allowing Lapanday to step in, HEARBCO 2s board approached TRAIN.
HEARBCO 2 saw a lease arrangement with a familiar partner as a way of overcoming
their debts and difficulties. One of the officials even narrated the dialogue she had with one
of the Ayala family members managing TRAIN. She told them “Ser, lupa niyo ito. Dati
niyo kaming trabahante. Naghihirap na kami.” 17. TRAIN decided to pay Lapanday for
HEARBCO 2s debts conditional on a lease agreement that would span 60 years. According
to one of the board members, they were hesitant to take the lease agreement for such a long
time, and many of their members did not trust the new partnership. However, once they
presented the reality of the debt figures, the members acquiesced. The lease agreement was
drafted by HEARBCO 2s legal counsel, and went into effect in 2014.
While the lease agreement with TRAIN stands for the next 60 years, HEARBCO 2
maintains some level of control over the AVA. HEARBCO 2 is responsible for hiring and
firing workers on the field and the packing houses, which gives them the ability to determine
the users of land. They are also responsible for operations, having themselves been growers
16”Come on, we couldnt count because we were crying!”
17“Sir, this was your land, and we were your workers. We are already having a hard time”
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in the past. Thus, HEARBCO 2’s deal with TRAIN is a Lease arrangement where they
maintain some sticks in the bundle, giving them some degree of control. It should be noted,
however, that these abilities are not spelled out in their contract with TRAIN.
Pantukan -The Pantukan ARBs were the only ARB group in my sample that was neither
organized when they first entered an AVA, nor officially listed by the DAR. They were once
tenants and farmworkers for a coconut farm. After the land was distributed, the ARBs
became indivicual coconut growers. From their experience, coconut was a highly lucrative
crop. They would be able to sell a kilo of copra, the dried meat or kernel used to make
coconut oil, for twenty pesos. However, they found that this was not the case. All the ARBs
were selling to one buyer, who now exercised monopsony power over the ARBs. The ARBs
were now selling a kilo of copra for 10 pesos a kilo.
Philippine Coconut authority estimates that, per hectare, a farmer can get a yield of 1230
kgs of copra per hectare. At this price, the gross revenue from their holdings would have
been 12,300 pesos per hectare or 30,750 in total. Taking out the average cost of cultivation
for 2.5 has. at 9, 703.5, estimated by the coconut authority, the net revenue from cultivating
coconuts would have been 21,046.5. The total payments to the Land Bank for amortization
and land taxes would have been about 8,946.19. (Figure taken from ARB receipts) This
leaves the ARB with a total annual income of 12,100.31, or a bi-weekly income of 456
pesos18. This low level of income did not allow the ARBs to meet their basic consumption
needs, and many of them were in danger of getting evicted from their holdings.
In around 2002, the Pantukan Agricultural Development Corporation (PADCOR) ap-
proached the ARBs individually with an offer to develop their lands into a banana plantation
in exchange for a leasing arrangement. Each of the ARBs saw this as an opportunity to pay
off their amortization. Further, the promise of a steady lease payment, and the framing of
the employment provisions made the lease contract seem like a lucrative proposition. In
a focus group discussion, they said that “Pwede kami mag -rekomenda og isang anak, o
18This is about 5 pesos less than the daily minimum wage of a worker in Metro Manila
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kami mismo mag trabaho”19. PADCOR eventually sold the lease to Musahamat in 2009.
Musahamat approached the ARBs with a very similar contract to PADCOR. They signed
the contracts because of a five-year advance on the lease payments. However, the promise
of work did not materialize. Numerous reasons were given to me by during the focus group
discussions, but one was remembered by all of the participants. Some of the ARBs children
work in nearby plantations which have unions organized by the Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU).
They were told that Musahamat did not want KMU to influence other workers since it may
disrupt production20.
Today, the ARBs have formed an association, and would like to gain legal status so that
they can withdraw their holdings from the lease. They have formed connections with both
(KMU) and the Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP) in the hope of gaining support in
advocacy21.
Comparing Histories -All ARB groups, apart from those in Pantukan were organized
into some sort of ARB association prior to the formation of their AVA. The ARBs of Pantukan
only made connections to pro land reform organizations after their lease contract was already
in place. However, being organized or having connections with pro reform forces by itself
does not guarantee an AVA that allows ARBs to control their holdings. In the case of the
Santo Tomas Lessors, their organization at the inception of the lease agreement with MEPI
did not seem to conduct education regarding AVAs in any serious manner. They merely
reinforced the merits of a lease contract. NGO and legal connections helped MIFARBCO,
MARBCO and HEARBCO 2. While the lessor groups of MEPI had legal consultation, they
did not have communication with pro land reform forces.Finally, the Pantukan ARBs did
not have legal consultation.
Group and individual debts, especially the amortization payment for the land, were a
factor in considering lease contracts as opposed to growership contracts. The ARBs per-
19“We can recommend 1 child or we ourselves can work”
20Kilusang mayo Uno- May 1st Muvement
21Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas- Peasant Movement of the Philippines
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ception of the level of debt that they may incur under alternative arrangements made the
lease agreement look lucrative. In the case of the Santo Tomas lessors, their possible debt
payments were magnified by the DAMARBAI leadership. The prospects of incurring greater
debt made HEARBCO 2s ARBs enter a leasing arrangement so that they could continue to
make amortization payments and keep their lands. The Pantukan ARBs, individually had
debts, but this mattered less than the financial gains to be made under a lease arrangement
with employment.
The category of membership consultation is quite ambiguous. DAMARBAIs consulta-
tion, according to focus groups, were more of an exercise in convincing members of the
merits of a lease contract. The Pantukan ARBs did not have an organization, but dis-
cussed lease prices among their neighbors. However, they had not bargained collectively.
Finally, HEARBCO 2, MIFARBCO, and MARBCO had clear channels of communication
with their board members. At least in the formation of their contracts, they were able to
provide education, present their case to their respective groups, and deliberate. Finally, MI-
FARBCO, MARBCO, and HEARBCO 2 had the opportunity to bargain with prospective
partners regarding the AVA contracts. The lessor ARBs from Santo Tomas have different
accounts of the bargaining process. The members of the current DAMARB-MPC say they
remember their board members bargaining with MEPI. The members of SIFARBCO and
STARBENCO say they did not. The likely answer is that some negotiation happened, but
the negotiators did not represent the interests of the ARBs because of the trivial education
and membership consultation.
Table 5 summarizes the contracts of the different ARB groups along with some costs,
benefits, and obligations. The lessor ARBs in Santo Tomas receive what is called a Ben-
eficiary Trust Fund (BTF) instead of a lease. This is computed as a step function giving
an amount of pesos depending on how many boxes are produced by the AVA22. The lease
payments to HEARBCO 2 and Pantukan ARBs is a fixed yearly amount with deductions for
22This computation is summarized in Table 9
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their amortization payments. The Pantukan ARBs receive a lease of about 22,000 pesos a
year. This amount increases by 5% every five years. HEARBCO 2’s lease amonts to arount
17,000 pesos a year after they have paid for debts and amortization payments. Under the
lease contracts, the ARBs do not share in the costs of production. By contrast, the grower
ARBs share in the costs of production, risk of their bananas being rejected, and possible
natural calamities, as with HEARBCO 2’s experience. Investors in growership also often
have the ability to take over the farms should there be crop failure.
5.1 Control
Table 6 gives the sticks in the bundle available to each ARB group. The columns in the table
are the same as the “sticks-in-the-bundle” from Table 1. None of the contracts stipulate any
room for ARBs to change the use of their holdings away from Banana production. Under
growership contracts, the ARBs can negotiate their per box prices, and determine who can
use and work on the land. Being able to negotiate the per box price has actually served
both groups well in the past. In the beginning of contracting with SUMIFRU, the per
box price for Class A bananas (at least 7.5 inches in length) used to be $2.90. The coops
eventually bargained up the price of class A boxes to $4.10 by presenting information from
farms growing for DOLE. In addition, the coop, MIFARBCO was able to gain the right to
look for other buyers of Class B bananas.
In contrast to the growership contracts, the lease contracts do not give ARBs the formal
right to bargain for better lease payments, or determine who gets to work on their holdings.
However, avenues exist for these groups to negotiate better leases, or greater remuneration.
In the case of the DAMARB-MPC members, they have been able to negotiate wage increases
and other benefits. Their contracts formally stipulate that MEPI will respect any collective
bargaining agreements made through the farm workers union of which, as employees of the
plantation, the DAMARB-MPC ARBs are members. However, this ability is conditional.
Until 2010, the members of SIFARBCO and STARBENCO were also members of DAMARB-
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MPC. They wanted to withdraw their holdings from the Lease contract. To do this, they
occupied their lands and refused to let the company harvest the standing crop. Since MEPI
determines who can work on the ARBs holdings, all the participants of the mass action were
terminated. These were 241 ARBs in total or 31% of DAMARB-MPCs original membership.
The ARBs from the Pantukan district also do not have the right to determine who
works on the plantation that leases their holdings. Of my sample, all of the ARBs reported
having at least one child who worked as casual laborers on other banana plantations in the
district. While these ARBs have no experience in banana farming, they were hoping that
their children would be able to get jobs in the plantation leasing their lands. I received
numerous accounts of why Musahammat farms did not want to hire from the ARB families.
One reason is under qualification, despite the fact that many of the families had members
who were working in other banana plantations. The other reason is that the countrys largest
trade federation has organized in the surrounding areas. Thus, hiring those that have worked
in other banana plantations would be allowing the trade union in the farm. Regardless of
the reason, the inability of the ARBs to determine who uses land has deprived them of the
ability to appropriate the gains of cultivation, and use their holdings.
The ARBs under growership arrangements have maintained a modicum of possession over
their holdings. They can determine who can work on their holdings, and thus, are entitled
to the gains from cultivation. They are also given a chance to withdraw from contracts and
renegotiate the price of their output. However, these abilities are limited. Withdrawing is
conditional upon whether they can pay SUMIFRU for its initial investments for the land
amortization owed to MEPI totalling 293,733 pesos per hectare. These costs were initially
paid by SUMIFRU to MEPI when the ARBs of MARBCO and MIFARBCO withdrew their
growership contract from MEPI. Regardless, the ARBs under growership contracts can look
for another buyer and withdraw, as long as they have the funds to do so. When I interviewed
the current Coop chairs of both MARBCO and MIFARBCO, they said that the ARBs would
like to leave the contract with SUMIFRU since other banana buyers are now locating in
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Santo Tomas. However, they are willing to continue the remaining two years of their current
contract since it is only a short time before the contract expires and their debts are paid.
In contrast, ARBs in lease contracts have not preserved possession over their holdings.
First, they have no control over who gets to work on their land, the use of the land, and
the methods of farming. While they may be able to change the level of remuneration they
receive, this can only be done insofar as they remain workers in the plantations on their
land. The experience of SIFARBCO, STARBENCO,and the ARBs of Pantukan show that
these ARBs remain vulnerable to the threat of exclusion from the use of their holdings.
5.2 Income
What effect does the allocation of control have on the income of the ARBs? Table 7 gives
information on ARB incomes. Total Income aggregates all income sources for each individual
ARB except for remittance income. This includes income from the AVAs, other plots of
land, pension payments, income from having a store, from driving motorcycles, carpentry,
and other activities. I excluded remittance income since the individual ARBs were reluctant
to give figures for remittances. Some gave the reason that they dont want to make a mistake
in their computation. Others simply found the question intrusive. Instead, I noted whether
or not they received some form of remittance from relatives overseas. AVA income is the
income that they get from the AVA alone, such as profits from selling bananas grown on
holdings they received from CARP, lease payments, and wages from their AVAs.
One of the justifications for AVAs is so that ARBs can use their holdings to generate
a viable agricultural livelihood (Department of Agrarian Reform, 1996). To indicate how
important the AVA income is to an individual in each group, I show here AVA income as
a percentage of overall income. I also note non agricultural income as a percentage of total
income to show the extent to which ARBs within different contractual arrangements are able
to depend on agriculture for livelihood. Finally, I note how many interviewees depend on
other family members for some support such as buying them food and other daily expenses.
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The median bi-weekly income of MARBCO members is 9,300 pesos ($202.17) while it is
11,800 pesos ($256.52) for MIFARBCO members 23. On the other hand, the best-off lessor
ARBs, in terms of total income, are those of HEARBCO 2 and DAMARB-MPC. The median
income of the DAMARB-MPC ARBs is 4934.16 pesos ($107.26) while it is 4608.69 pesos
($ 100.19) for HEARBCO 2. However, the median interviewee from DAMARB-MPC draws
only 17% of total income from the AVA. Much of the income is drawn from other activities.
This is because many of the interviewees from DAMARB-MPC are retirees who own small
stores or have pensions. In contrast, the ARBs of the groups who are not able to gain
employment from the AVAs on their holdings are worse off. The median interviewee from
SIFARBCO earns a bi-weekly income of 3304.16 pesos ($71.83), while that of STARBENCO
earns 2807.38 pesos ($61.03). The median interviewee from the group of Pantukan ARBs
earns 3249.90 pesos ($70.65). The gap between the total income of the median HEARBCO
2 interviewee end that of SIFARBCO then is 1304.53 pesos ($28.36). It is also notable that
SIFARBCO, STARBENCO and the Pantukan ARBs get most of their income from non
agricultural sources. Further, a greater proportion of the interviewees from these groups
depend on other family members for income. Many of the able-bodied ARBs from these
three groups have taken jobs in the farms of other growers or have found non agricultural
employment such as carpentry, smithing, and driving tricycles24.
5.3 Other Measures of Well-Being
Income, however, is only one dimension of welfare. Table 8 presents data collected on indi-
cators of family welfare, conditions of the household, savings, and ownership of key assets.
Of the key assets, I chose the ownership of a Motorcycle and a mobile. The motorcycle is a
common vehicle in these areas where the roads are often unpaved. It allows people to travel
across narrow roads and bridges. Owning a mobile phone has become essential in commu-
nication whether for deliveries, town meetings, and making appointments at government
23The peso-dollar exchange rate at the time of the survey was about 46 pesos to one dollar.
24Tricyccles are passenger vehicles which consist of a motorcycle harnessed with a very colorful sidecar.
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offices.
Ownership or access to a mobile phone, in-house electricity, and toilets are available to
all the ARBs. Those who have growership contracts, however, have less of an incidence
of children who discontinued schooling due to financial reasons. The incidence of children
discontinuing schooling due to financial reasons is particularly high for the Lessor ARBs
who cannot work on their lands, and the ARBs of HEARBCO 2 which suffered losses due
to typhoon Pablo. It should be noted, however, that in HEARBCO 2’s case, this was not
due to their contract with TRAIN but because of their growership with Lapanday.
Running water in-house is not available to the ARBs in Pantukan, but this is mostly
because of the infrastructure development in the municipality. All of them, however, have
access to water wells on their lots. The incidence of motorcycle ownership is also higher
among members of grower coops, except for HEARBCO 2s members where all who were
surveyed had motor cycles. Finally, Growers also have a higher incidence of respondents
who reported savings.
6 Discussion and Policy Implications
The histories of the different ARB groups resulted in different contracts. The contracts in
turn affect their well-being today in terms of their income, and their ability to obtain valuable
assets and education for their children. In this section, I will discuss criteria under which we
can assess the effects of these contracts on the ARBs livelihood. I shall then outline some
possible policy implications.
6.1 Normative Analysis
There are two ways we can conduct a normative analysis on AVAs. The first is to take
into account possible counterfactual scenarios for each ARB grouping. For the Santo Tomas
ARBs, we can directly compare the lease and growership contracts since these were the
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alternatives that were available to the ARBs at the time of contracting. The HEARBCO 2
ARBs were facing a choice between continuing as growers, perhaps with another company,
or, with taking the lease option from TRAIN. Finally, the Pantukan ARBs faced the choice
of entering an AVA or not.
With respect to the Santo Tomas ARBs, the lease AVAs have certainly been detrimental
to the ARBs of DAMARB-MPC, SIFARBCO and STARBENCO. If the ARBs chose to only
accept growership contracts, their fortunes would be different today. Some may still have
contracted with MEPI, but competition from SUMIFRU and other buyers would have made
it difficult for MEPI to exploit monopsony power over the ARBs. Certainly, the absence of
NGO advising, legal counsel, and strong ARB organizing had a role to play in the divergent
outcomes between the leasing and grower ARBs. Further, DAMARBAIs push to convince
the ARBs that they had a better chance as lessors created uncertainty about the growership
contracts. As one SIFARBCO member puts it: “Walang hiya yang DAMARABAI, nanloko
lang. Naku kung alam lang namin sana”25.
Some lease contracts, however, are an improvement. Assuming that the Pantukan ARBs
prices remain as they were when they harvested the last of their coconut crop, then the ARBs
fared better taking the AVA. The lease contract of the HEARCO 2 members allowed them
to avoid further debt, and they have been able to make a living with the lease payments and
wages. One counterfactual scenario for the ARBs of HEARBCO 2 would have been a similar
growership contract to that of MIFARBCO and MARBCO under SUMIFRU. In my focus
group discussions with coop members, SUMIFRU had offered the same deal, with the same
conditions, but, perhaps for a longer period since the debts of HEARBCO 2 were larger.
Had they gotten this deal under SUMIFRU, they may have had to take out more debts to
cover the damage done to their farms, provide fertilizer and other inputs, and would have
had to pay SUMIFRU for their aerial spraying. It is difficult to say whether a SUMIFRU-
HEARBCO 2 partnership would have resulted in better outcomes, or, outcomes equivalent
25Damn that DAMARBAI, all they did was lie. If we only knew.
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to that of MARBCO and MIFARBCO.
The other way to conduct a normative analysis is to ask whether these AVAs meet certain
ends. These can be taken from the official justifications of the state for encouraging such
arrangements. The first is to make smallholder farming economically viable for the farmer.
The second is to ensure beneficiary possession and control of the land. Last is to introduce
facilities and technological improvements that could increase ARB incomes 26. Under these
criteria, the contracts of MARBCO and MIFARBCO have certainly succeeded. The one
issue that they have is that there is no visible way to observe outside options so they can
bargain for better prices.
Under this criteria, AVAs have failed the Pantukan ARBs, the members of SIFARBCO
and the members of STARBENCO. While the median income of the sample exceeds poverty
incomes, the ARBs in my sample obtained income largely from activities outside their hold-
ings27. Thus, the improvements that were introduced on the ARBs holdings do not facilitate
their livelihood. Moreover, these ARBs cannot utilize their land, let alone gain any control
of it. One of the questions that I had asked all interviewees was why they thought it was
important to own land. One of the pantukan ARBs answered this question as follows: Wala
mamatay na kami28.
While the Lease AVAs have been kinder to ARBs in HEARBCO 2 and DAMARB-MPC,
it has only been kind insofar as these ARBs have continued their employment in the AVA.
The stipulations of the contracts, however, do not give ARBs the right to be employed
on their landholdings. These decisions are made by MEPI and TRAIN. However, stipula-
tions that help ARBs gain some control over employment exist in each of these situations.
DAMARB-MPC, and HEARBCO, under the current management structure are responsible
for personnel issues including hiring and termination. Again, however, it is questionable
26These objectives are stated in the Administrative Order 09-06 under the Department of Agrarian Reform.
In the time I was in the Philippines, this administrative order was translated into a law to regulate AVAs
called House Bill 5161. It has not yet passed.
27By poverty income, I am using the World Bank standard of $1.90/day, which, in bi-weekly terms would
come to 1,223.6 pesos(World Bank and IMF, 2015).
28”None well be dead before then.”
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whether these rights are secure since these are not written in their contracts.
6.2 Policy implications
Steps have to be taken to avoid contractual arrangements that deprive ARBs of control over
their lands. The DAR explicitly discourages the formation of lease arrangements, calling
it a “last resort”(Presidential Agrarian Reform Committee, 1997). Such policies, without
addressing the underlying economic considerations that motivate lease arrangements, are
insufficient. As in the case of HEARBCO 2, even growership arrangements can be written
to pass costs to ARBs, preventing their success and driving them to financial hardship.
Based on my findings, ARBs enter lease contracts to avoid further indebtedness, and
to insulate themselves from risk. In the context of the Philippines, sources of indebtedness
include amortization payments, and payments for infrastructure and fertilizers. Some land
reform advocates have already called for making land distribution free29. Ensuring that
ARB organizations receive subsidized credit, conditional upon certain productive purposes
may complement the proposal to eliminate amortization payments. In this way, ARBs can
bear some risks in owner cultivatorship, allowing them to establish coops that can effectively
provide some assistance in production along the lines of MARBCO and MIFARBCO. Mi-
croeconomic interventions that enable smallholder organizations to organize and bargain for
better contracts, reduce costs of marketing crops for smallholders, and measures that ease
access to technologies are more effective(Reardon et al., 2009). Thus, the problems that
AVAs were supposed to address would be exactly those that need to be addressed for these
arrangements to be viable for ARBs.
Another possible intervention is to reduce the costs of renegotiating contracts for ARB
organizations. Costs come from legal assistance, and the institutional procedures for re-
negotiating. In the case of SIFARBCO and STARBENCO, they are still waiting for the
PARC to adjudicate their case. Such a case should not have to sit in the office of the president.
29The new proposal by a coalition of progressive parties called the Makabayan (Pro-people) bloc is called
the Genuine Agrarian Reform Bill. This has not yet passed, but proposes free land distribution.
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Streamlining contract negotiations at the municipal agrarian reform office should be enough.
As landowners, they should be given the power to evict lessees when they deem their actions
inimical to their interests. This would be a minor change in the contracting procedure, but it
is a way of ensuring that ARBs have a credible threat vis-a-vis an agribusiness corporation.
It should also go without saying that affordable legal assistance should be made readily
available for such groups.
Both these proposals tackle the economic and institutional factors that result in AVAs
which are unfavorable to the ARBs at the micro level. This paper however does not address
whether or not AVAs meet larger development goals such as enhancing agricultural produc-
tivity, linking agriculture to other sectors, and generating more foreign exchange. Such a
study cannot be done within the limits of the information I provide in this paper.
7 Tables and Maps
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Figure 1: The Field Site
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Remuneration Control
Structure of Smallholder Investor Smallholder Investor
Incorporation
Lease Wage Profits User Methods
User
Withdrawal
Use
↑
Joint Venture Profit-share Profit Share User User
Withdrawal Withdrawal
↓ Use Use
Methods Methods
Growership Profits Export Profits User
Withdrawal Withdrawal
Use Use
Methods Methods
Table 1: Different contract types and the allocation of abilities. Arrows are meant to show
that Joint ventures are an intermediary form of contract.Italics are meant to indicate an
ability shared by each partner.
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Owns Yrs of Exp
Number Number Average Education Household Dwelling With
Total in Sample Female Age (Mode) Size and Lot Cavendish
Location Group (71 Total) In Sample
Growers Santo Tomas MARB 45 8 1 57.5 HSU 6.87 7 34.25
MIFARB 88 6 2 56.33 HSG 6.7 5 32.25
Lease DAMARB 520 7 1 57.71 CLU 4.29 6 30
(Group)
SIFARB 137 15 3 57.27 HSU 4.4 13 28
STARB 104 6 1 61.67 ELMU 5.33 6 26
Tagum HEARB 368 20 3 53.85 CGR 4.45 20 31.25
Lease (Ind) Pantukan Individual 13 up 9 3 64 ELMU 5.22 1 0
Table 2: The Sample Description- Education in terms of Mode and noted as follows: ELMU-Eelementary Undergaduate,ELG-Eelementary Graduate, HSU-High School
Undergraduate, HSG-High School Graduate, CLU-College Undergraduate,CGR-College Graduate.
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Total Land Individual Year of Current Former YEAR of Curr AVA Tenure Previous AVA
Area (ha) Plots (ha) CLOA Owners AVA Partner Transition AVA Dispute
Location Group
Santo Tomas MARB 47.52 1.02 2004 MEPI 2007 SUMIFRU Gr to Gr MEPI N
MIFARB 89.76 1.02 2004 MEPI 2007 SUMIFRU Gr to Gr MEPI N
DAMARB 799.564 1.04 2002 MEPI 2002 MEPI FW to FW+Lr None N
SIFARB 1.04 2002 MEPI 2002 MEPI FW to Lr None Y
STARB 1.04 2002 MEPI 2002 MEPI FW to Lr None Y
Tagum HEARB 294.325 0.8 1997 HIJO 2014 TRAIN Gr to FW+Lr Lapanday N
PAN Indiv ARBs 32.5(up) 2.5(6) 1992 Nuere & Sons 2009 Musahamat Lr to Lr PADCOR Y
.6(3) Piansay
Table 3: Description of AVAs
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Org at Time
of Bargaining AVA Membership Legal Organization AVA
AVA Education Consultation Counsel Debt Bargaining
Group
MARB Y Y Y Y Y Y
Growership
MIFARB Y Y Y Y Y Y
Lease DAMARB Y Y Y N N N
(Group)
SIFARB Y N N N N N
STARB Y N N N N N
HEARB Y Y Y Y Y Y
Lease (Ind.) Pan Indiv ARBs N N N N N Y
Table 4: Organizational Characteristics at the time of AVA Bargaining:Y=This was available to the ARB group, N=
This was not available
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ARB Investor ARB sells
Contract Length Cost Production Responsi- Class B, Pre- Other Plants
Type (Years) Remuneration Share Risks bilities Rejects Termination Allowed
Location Group
Santo Tomas MARB Grower 10 Per box Infra, Inputs, Rejected Bxs, Quality Control Y Investor N
Growers Labor, Full take over Packing Materials
Improvements clauses
MIFARB Grower 10 Per box Infra, Inputs, Rejected Bxs, Quality Control N Investor N
Labor, Full take over Packing Materials
Improvements clauses
Lease DAMARB Lease 30 BTF+Emp None None All Production N Investor N
(Group)
SIFARB Lease 30 BTF None None All Production N Investor N
STARB Lease 30 BTF None None All Production N Investor N
Tagum HEARB Lease 60 Lease+Emp None None All Production N Investor N
Lease (Ind.) Pantukan Indiv ARBs Lease 25 Lease None None All Production N Investor N
Table 5: Contracts offered to groups of ARBs
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GROUP Det. Land Use Det. Rem. Withdraw Det. Methods Det. User
Growership MARB N Y C C Y
MIFARB N Y C C Y
Lease DAMARB N C N N N
(Group) SIFARB N C N N N
STARB N C N N N
HEARB N C N N Y
Lease (Ind.) PAN N N N N N
Table 6: The-Sticks-In-the-Bundle under each group’s contract. Y=The group has this
ability, N=The group does not have this ability, C= The group has this ability conditionally.
Total
Income AVA AVA Non-Ag Remittance Other Income
(Median Income (% of Total) (% of Total) (% of Sample) Earner
Location Group Reported) (Median) (% of Sample)
Santo Tomas MARBCO 9300 8050 71.00% 5.00% 0% 37.5%
Growership
MIFARBCO 11800 10250 100.00% 0% 0% 16%
DAMARB-MPC 4934.16 645.83 17.00% 39.00% 0 14.29%
Lease
(Group) SIFARBCO 3304.6 554.6 14.58% 82.60% 0 60%
STARBENCO 2807.38 554.6 24.14% 62.00% 16.7% 100%
Tagum HEARBCO 2 4608.69 4608.69 100.00% 0% 10% 25%
Lease (Ind.) Pantukan Indiv ARBs 3249.90 1399.9 25.86% 68.76% 11% 44%
Table 7: Income Information: The numbers given are bi-weekly figures in Philippine
Pesos. AVA Income as a % of Total Income is reported for the median interviewee. ”Remit-
tance” and ”Other” sources not reported in pesos, but as a percentage of the sample who
reported that these are part of their income.
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Child Stop Running
School due Water Toilet
to Finance in House Access Electricity Motorcycle Mobile Savings
Location Group
Santo Tomas MARB 0% 87.5% 100% 100% 75% 100% 50%
Growership
MIFARB 17% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 66.7%
DAMARB 14.29% 100% 100% 100% 43% 100% 14.29%
Lease
(Group) SIFARB 73.33% 100% 100% 100% 27% 100% 0%
STARB 67% 100% 100% 100% 67% 100% 0%
Tagum HEARB 55% 90% 100% 100% 100% 100% 25%
Lease (Ind.) Pantukan Indiv ARBs 55% 0% 100% 100% 56% 100% 0%
Table 8: Selected Assets, Childhood Education, and Facilities in dwelling possessed
or achieved by ARBs
Annual Incentive/ Incentive/
Yield Box Box
(Boxes) ($) (Pesos)
≤ 4200 .071 2.8
4201-4300 .076 3.04
4301-4400 .081 3.24
4401-4500 .086 3.44
4501-4600 .091 3.64
4601-4700 .096 3.84
4701-4800 .101 4.04
4801-4900 .106 4.24
4901-5000 (or greater) .111 4.44
Table 9: based on 40 pesos/dollar
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